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Debra M. Nelson
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cc: Karl L Hendrickson
John N. Brems

IOWA, PETITIONER v. FELIPE EDGARDO TOVAR
No. 02-1541
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837
January 21, 2004, Argued
March 8, 2004, Decided

NOTICE: [*1]
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to change pending release of the final published version.
PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. State v.
Tovar, 656 N. W.2d 112, 2003 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 32 (Iowa, 2003)
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts:

SYLLABUS: At respondent Tovar's November 1996 arraignment for operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol (OWI), in response to the trial court's questions, Tovar affirmed that he wanted to
represent himself and to plead guilty. Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy
and public jury trial where he would have the right to counsel who could help him select a jury, question
and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and make arguments on his behalf. By pleading guilty, the
court cautioned, Tovar would give up his [*2] right to a trial and his rights at that trial to be represented by
counsel, to remain silent, to the presumption of innocence, and to subpoena witnesses and compel their
testimony. The court then informed Tovar of the maximum and minimum penalties for an OWI conviction,
and explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty
of the charged offense. To that end, the court informed Tovar of the two elements of the OWI charge: The
defendant must have (1) operated a motor vehicle in Iowa (2) while intoxicated. Tovar confirmed, first, that
on the date in question, he was operating a motor vehicle in Iowa and, second, that he did not dispute the
result of the intoxilyzer test showing his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. The
court then accepted his guilty plea and, at a hearing the next month, imposed the minimum sentence of two
days in jail and a fine. In 1998, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a second offense, an
aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. Represented by counsel in that proceeding, he pleaded guilty. In
2000, Tovar was charged with third-offense OWI, a class "DM felony under [*3] Iowa law. Again
represented by counsel, Tovar pleaded not guilty to the felony charge. Counsel moved to preclude use of
Tovar's first (1996) OWI conviction to enhance his 2000 offense from an aggravated misdemeanor to a
third-offense felony. Tovar maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid — not fully knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary - because he was never made aware by the court of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation. The trial court denied the motion, found Tovar guilty, and sentenced him on the OWI
third-offense charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and
remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction. Holding that the
colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been constitutionally inadequate, Iowa's high
court ruled, as here at issue, that two warnings not given to Tovar are essential to the "knowing and
intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea stage: The defendant must be advised
specifically that waiving counsel's assistance in deciding whether to plead guilty (1) entails the risk that a
viable defense will be overlooked [*4] and (2) deprives him of the opportunity to obtain an independent
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty.

Held: Neither warning ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The
constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Pp. 8-15.
(a) The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical
stages" of the criminal process, see, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477, including a plea hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (per
curiam). Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his first OWI conviction, he had a right to
counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. Although an accused may choose to forgo representation,
any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and [*5] intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. The information a defendant must possess in order to
make an intelligent election depends on a range of case-specific factors, including his education or
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. Although warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding
to trial uncounseled must be "rigorously" conveyed, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 US. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S Ct. 2525, a less
searching or formal colloquy may suffice at earlier stages of the criminal process, 487 U.S., at 299, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. In Patterson, this Court described a pragmatic approach to right-to-counsel
waivers, one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in
question, and what assistance [counsel] could provide to an accused at that stage." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Less rigorous warnings are required pretrial because, at that stage, "the full dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious [*6] to an accused than
they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389. Pp. 8-11.
(b) The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two admonitions ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court. "The
law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances . . . . "
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450. Even if the defendant lacked a
full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, the State may
nevertheless prevail if it shows that the information provided to the defendant satisfied the constitutional
minimum. Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Iowa high court gave
insufficient consideration to this Court's guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding
them necessary in every guilty plea instance, that court overlooked this Court's observations that the
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend upon the particular facts and
circumstances in each case, Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Moreover, as
Tovar acknowledges, [*7] in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden
to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Tovar has never claimed
that he did not fully understand the 1996 OWI charge or the range of punishment for that crime prior to
pleading guilty. He has never "articulated with precision" the additional information counsel could have
provided, given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct.
2389. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment.
Before this Court, he suggests only that he may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to
counsel at trial, but not if he was, instead, going to plead guilty. Given "the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding [this] case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019, it is
far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened
Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the two
admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him, [*8] i.e., the
warnings might be misconstrued to convey that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could
plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain
hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt
disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or
the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. States are free to
adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful, but
the Federal Constitution does not require the two admonitions here in controversy. Pp. 11-15.

656 N. W. 2d 112, reversed and remanded.
JUDGES: GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
OPINIONBY: GINSBURG
OPINION:
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all
critical stages of the criminal process. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477 (1985); United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S Ct. 1926 (1967). [*9] The
entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a "critical stage" at which the
right to counsel adheres. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S Ct. 2006 (1972)\
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the
right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a "knowing, intelligent
act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before
accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation.
Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to
be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that
"waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense
will be overlooked"; and (2) "admonish" the defendant "that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on [*10] whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is
wise to plead guilty"? 656 N. W.2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003). The Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings
essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Ibid.
We hold that neither warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty
plea.
I
On November 2, 1996, respondent Felipe Edgardo Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was
arrested in Ames, Iowa, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI). See Iowa
Code § 321J.2 (1995). nl An intoxilyzer test administered the night of Tovar's arrest showed he had a
blood alcohol level of 0.194. App. 24. The arresting officer informed Tovar of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602 (1966). Tovar signed a form stating that he waived
those rights and agreed to answer questions. Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public [*11] Safety, OWI
Supplemental Report 3 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner; Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety,
Rights Warnings (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner.

nl "A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor
vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage . .. . b. While having an alcohol concentration . . . of .10 or more." Iowa Code §
321J.2(1) (1995).
Some hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County.
The judge indicated on the Initial Appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived
application for court-appointed counsel. Initial Appearance in No. OWCR 23989 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging
of Petitioner. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar was "informed of the charge and his
. .. rights and received a copy of the Complaint." Ibid. Arraignment was set for November 18, 1996. In the
interim, [*12] Tovar was released from jail.

At the November 18 arraignment, n2 the court's inquiries of Tovar began: "Mr. Tovar appears without
counsel and I see, Mr. Tovar, that you waived application for a court appointed attorney. Did you want to
represent yourself at today's hearing?" App. 8-9. Tovar replied: "Yes, sir." Id., at 9. The court soon after
asked: "How did you wish to plead?" Tovar answered: "Guilty." Ibid. Tovar affirmed that he had not been
promised anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty. Id., at 13-14.

n2 Tovar appeared in court along with four other individuals charged with misdemeanor
offenses. App. 6-10. The presiding judge proposed to conduct the plea proceeding for the five cases
jointly, and each of the individuals indicated he did not object to that course of action. Id., at 11.
Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule
Crim. Proc. 8 (1992), n3 the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, [*13] he would be entitled
to a speedy and public trial by jury, App. 15, and would have the right to be represented at that trial by an
attorney, who "could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present
evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf," id., at 16. By
pleading guilty, the court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of any kind on the
charge against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be represented by an attorney at that trial." Ibid. The
court further advised Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain silent at
trial, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and compel their
testimony. Id., at 16-19.

n3 The Rule has since been renumbered 2.8.
Turning to the particular offense with which Tovar had been charged, the court informed him that an
OWI conviction carried a maximum penalty [*14] of a year in jail and a $ 1,000 fine, and a minimum
penalty of two days in jail and a $ 500 fine. Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed that he understood his exposure to
those penalties. Ibid. The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure
itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense. Id., at 21-22. To that end, the court informed
Tovar that the OWI charge had only two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was operating a
motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, when he did so, he was intoxicated. Id., at 23. Tovar confirmed
that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute the
results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood alcohol
level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. Id., at 23-24.
After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar if he still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that
he did. Id., at 27-28. The court then accepted Tovar's plea, observing that there was "a factual basis" for it,
and that Tovar had made the plea "voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, [*15] [and] . . . of
the consequences of [pleading guilty]." Id., at 28.
On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for sentencing on the OWI charge n4 and, simultaneously, for
arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license. Id., at 45-46; see Iowa Code §
321J.21 (1995). n5 Noting that Tovar was again in attendance without counsel, the court inquired: "Mr.
Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an
attorney to represent you?" App. 46. n6 Tovar replied that he would represent himself. Ibid. The court then
engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the suspension charge as it had on the OWI charge the
previous month. Id., at 48-51. After accepting Tovar's guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court
sentenced him on both counts: For the OWI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two
days in jail and a $ 500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension conviction, the court imposed a
$ 250 fine, plus a surcharge and costs. Id., at 55.

n4 At that stage, it was still open to Tovar to request withdrawal of his guilty plea on the OWI
charge and to substitute a plea of not guilty. See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992). [*16]

n5 In order to appear at the OWI arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse despite the
suspension of his license; he was apprehended en route home. App. 50, 53.
n6 Prior to asking Tovar whether he wished to hire counsel, the court noted that Tovar had
applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his application had been denied because he was
financially dependent upon his parents. Id., at 46. Tovar does not here challenge the absence of
counsel at sentencing.
On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of OWI for a second time. He was represented by counsel in
that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 24, n. 1.
On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a third offense, see Iowa
Code § 321J.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while license barred, see § 321.561. Iowa law
classifies first-offense OWI as a serious misdemeanor and second-offense OWI as an aggravated
misdemeanor. § § 321J.2(2)(a)-(b). Third-offense OWI, and any OWT offenses thereafter, rank as class
"D" felonies. § 321J.2(2)(c). Represented [*17] by an attorney, Tovar pleaded not guilty to both December
2000 charges. Record 55.
In March 2001, through counsel, Tovar filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law Points; then7 motion
urged that Tovar's first OWI conviction, in 1996, could not be used to enhance the December 2000 OWI
charge from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. App. 3-5. n8 Significantly,
Tovar did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996 arraignment of his right to counsel prior to
pleading guilty and at the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid ~
not "full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" — because he "was never made aware by the court. .. of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id., at 3-4.

n7 See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 10(2) (1992) ("Any defense, objection, or request which is
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by
motion."); State v. Wilt, 333 N. W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for
adjudication of law points under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material facts are
undisputed). [* 18]

n8 Tovar conceded that the 1998 OWI conviction could be used for enhancement purposes.
Record 60.
The court denied Tovar's motion in May 2001, explaining: "Where the offense is readily understood by
laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only
that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to counsel and a willingness to proceed without
counsel in the face of such awareness." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37 (brackets in original). Tovar then
waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the court of both the OWI third-offense charge and
driving while license barred. Id., at 33. Four months after that adjudication, Tovar was sentenced. On the
OWI third-offense charge, he received a 180-day jail term, with ail but 30 days suspended, three years of
probation, and a $ 2,500 fine plus surcharges and costs. App. 70-71. For driving while license barred, Tovar
received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the OWI sentence, and a suspended $ 500 fine. Id., at
71.
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, [*19] App. to Pet. for Cert. 23-30, but the Supreme Court of
Iowa, by a 4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first
OWI conviction, 656 N. W.2d 112 (2003). Iowa's highest court acknowledged that "the dangers of
proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a
jury trial, [therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be different." Id., at 119. The court
nonetheless held that the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been
constitutionally inadequate, and instructed dispositively:

"[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be
advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.... The trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that
there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving
the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be
overlooked. [*20] The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise
to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges
against him and the range of allowable punishments." Id., at 121. n9

n9 The dissenting justices criticized the majority's approach as "rigid" and out of line with the
pragmatic approach this Court described in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988). 656 N. W. 2d, at 122. They noted that, in addition to advice concerning
the constitutional rights a guilty plea relinquishes, Tovar was "made fully aware of the penal
consequences that might befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty." Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. , 156 L. Ed. 2d 703, 124 S. Ct. 44(2003), in view of the division of
opinion on the requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes for waiver of counsel [*21] at a plea hearing,
compare, e.g., United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146-1147 (CA9 2002), with State v. Cashman, 491
N. W.2d 462, 465-466 (S. D. 1992), and we now reverse the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court.
II
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical
stages" of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477\ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224, 18 L. Ed 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926. A plea hearing qualifies as
a "critical stage." White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050. Because Tovar
received a two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage
and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d
530, 92 S. Ct. 2006.
A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation. While the Constitution
"does not force a lawyer upon a defendant," Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87
L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942), it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent, [*22] see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019
(1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI plea hearing, was
insufficiently informed, and therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did
not elaborate on the value, at that stage of the case, of an attorney's advice and the dangers of selfrepresentation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent 15. nlO

nlO The United States as amicus curiae reads our decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 US. 367, 59
L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), to hold that a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a
misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term of imprisonment, affords no
ground for disturbing the underlying conviction. Amicus accordingly contends that the Constitution
should not preclude use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance the penalty for a
subsequent offense, regardless of the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 11, n. 3. The State, however, does not contest the Iowa Supreme Court's
determination that a conviction obtained without an effective waiver of counsel cannot be used to
enhance a subsequent charge. See ibid. We therefore do not address arguments amicus advances
questioning that premise. See also id., at 29, n. 12.

[*23]
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant "knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open." Adams, 317 U.S., at 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236. We have not,
however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed

without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election, our
decisions indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019.
As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se,
he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562,
95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in Faretta resisted counsel's aid, preferring to represent
himself. The Court held that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that right,
however, we cautioned: "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in
order competently [*24] and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing
" Id., at 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988), we elaborated
on "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to which Faretta referred. "At trial," we
observed, "counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and
evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively . . .,
object to improper prosecution questions, and much more." 487 U.S., at 299, n. 13, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108
S. Ct. 2389. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel, we therefore said, must be
"rigorously" conveyed. Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We clarified, however, that at
earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice. Id., at 299, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389.
Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we
held, the warnings required [*25] by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 161. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602
(1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment rights, but of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as well. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Miranda
warnings, we said, effectively convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning. In
addition, they inform him of the "ultimate adverse consequence" of making uncounseled admissions, i.e.,
his statements may be used against him in any ensuing criminal proceeding. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Miranda warnings, we added, "also sufficed . . . to let [the defendant] know what
a lawyer could 'do for him,"' namely, advise him to refrain from making statements that could prove
damaging to his defense. 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389.
Patterson describes a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," one that asks "what purposes a
lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide
to an accused at that stage," in order "to determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and
the type of warnings and procedures that should be required before a waiver [*26] of that right will be
recognized." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We require less rigorous warnings pretrial,
Patterson explained, not because pretrial proceedings are "less important" than trial, but because, at that
stage, "the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious to
an accused than they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Tovar's case, the State maintains that, like the Miranda warnings we found adequate in Patterson,
Iowa's plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure that his guilty
plea is informed and voluntary. Brief for Petitioner 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to
the State, "makes plain that an attorney's role would be to challenge the charge or sentence," and therefore
adequately conveys to the defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of self-representation. Brief
for Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other hand, defends the precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme
Court, see supra, at 7-8, as essential to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea stage [*27] waiver of
counsel. Brief for Respondent 15.
To resolve this case, we need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the plea colloquy
was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more
in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel at his Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed
that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see supra, at 3, and declined the court's offer of
"time to hire an attorney" at sentencing, when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea, see
supra, at 4-5, and n. 4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant must be alerted to his right to the

assistance of counsel in entering a plea. See Brief for Petitioner 19 (acknowledging defendant's need to
know "retained or appointed counsel can assist" at the plea stage by "working on the issues of guilt and
sentencing"). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume that Tovar was informed of his
entitlement to counsel's aid or, at least, to have pretermitted that issue. See 656 N. W. 2d, at 117.
Accordingly, the State presents a narrower question: "Does the Sixth Amendment [*28] require a court to
give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an
attorney, that an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that
without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense?" Pet. for Cert. i.
Training on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, the particular language the Iowa Supreme Court
employed in announcing the warnings it thought the Sixth Amendment required: "The trial judge [must]
advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by
laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the
risk that a viable defense will be overlooked," 656 N. W. 2d, at 121; in addition, "the defendant should be
admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty," ibid. Tovar did not
receive such advice, and the sole question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment compels the two
admonitions here in controversy. [*29] nl 1 We hold it does not.

nl 1 The Supreme Court of Iowa also held that "the court must ensure the defendant understands
the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments." 656 N. W. 2d, at 121.
The parties do not dispute that Tovar was so informed.
This Court recently explained, in reversing a lower court determination that a guilty plea was not
voluntary: "The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
circumstances ~ even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking
it." United States v. Ruiz, 536 US. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450 (2002) (emphasis in
original). We similarly observed in Patterson: "If [the defendant] . . . lacked a full and complete
appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that
the information it provided [*30] to him satisfied the constitutional minimum." 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed.
2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa Supreme Court gave insufficient
consideration to these guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in
every guilty plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will "depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S.
Ct. 1019; supra, at 9.
Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the
defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of
counsel. See Watts v. State, 257 N. W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977); Brief for Respondent 5, 26-27. In that light,
we note that Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment
for the crime prior to pleading guilty. Further, he has never "articulated with precision" the additional
information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the [*31] charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S.,
at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; supra, at 4. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right
to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he "may have been
under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead
guilty." Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added). nl2

nl2 The trial court's comment that Tovar appeared without counsel at the arraignment and the
court's inquiry whether Tovar wanted to represent himself at that hearing, see App. 8-9, hardly lend
support to Tovar's suggestion of what he "may have" believed. See also id., at 46 (court's inquiry at
sentencing whether Tovar "wanted to take some time to hire an attorney"); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8
(2)(a) (1992) ("at any time before judgment," defendant may request withdrawal of guilty plea and
substitution of not guilty plea).

Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case," see Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464,
82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 [*32] it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa
Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In
a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might
confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court
declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that
the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays
his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal
charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the
defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be
wasted. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28-29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21.
We note, finally, that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance
of an uncounseled plea they deem useful. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a) [*33] (2003); Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.111(d) (2003); Md. Ct. Rule 4-215 (2002); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 5.02 (2003); Pa. Rule
Crim. Proc. 121, comment (2003). We hold only that the two admonitions the Iowa Supreme Court ordered
are not required by the Federal Constitution.
***
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Tovar, 656 N. W.2d 112, 2003 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 32 (Iowa, 2003)
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts:

SYLLABUS: At respondent Tovar's November 1996 arraignment for operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol (OWI), in response to the trial court's questions, Tovar affirmed that he wanted to
represent himself and to plead guilty. Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy
and public jury trial where he would have the right to counsel who could help him select a jury, question
and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and make arguments on his behalf. By pleading guilty, the
court cautioned, Tovar would give up his [*2] right to a trial and his rights at that trial to be represented by
counsel, to remain silent, to the presumption of innocence, and to subpoena witnesses and compel their
testimony. The court then informed Tovar of the maximum and minimum penalties for an OWI conviction,
and explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty
of the charged offense. To that end, the court informed Tovar of the two elements of the OWI charge: The
defendant must have (1) operated a motor vehicle in Iowa (2) while intoxicated. Tovar confirmed, first, that
on the date in question, he was operating a motor vehicle in Iowa and, second, that he did not dispute the
result of the intoxilyzer test showing his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. The
court then accepted his guilty plea and, at a hearing the next month, imposed the minimum sentence of two
days in jail and a fine. In 1998, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a second offense, an
aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. Represented by counsel in that proceeding, he pleaded guilty. In
2000, Tovar was charged with third-offense OWI, a class "D" felony under [*3] Iowa law. Again
represented by counsel, Tovar pleaded not guilty to the felony charge. Counsel moved to preclude use of
Tovar's first (1996) OWI conviction to enhance his 2000 offense from an aggravated misdemeanor to a
third-offense felony. Tovar maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid — not fully knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary - because he was never made aware by the court of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation. The trial court denied the motion, found Tovar guilty, and sentenced him on the OWI
third-offense charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and
remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction. Holding that the
colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been constitutionally inadequate, Iowa's high
court ruled, as here at issue, that two warnings not given to Tovar are essential to the "knowing and
intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea stage: The defendant must be advised
specifically that waiving counsel's assistance in deciding whether to plead guilty (1) entails the risk that a
viable defense will be overlooked [*4] and (2) deprives him of the opportunity to obtain an independent
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty.

Held: Neither warning ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The
constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Pp. 8-15.
(a) The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical
stages" of the criminal process, see, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477, including a plea hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 US 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (per
curiam). Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his first OWI conviction, he had a right to
counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. Although an accused may choose to forgo representation,
any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and [*5] intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. The information a defendant must possess in order to
make an intelligent election depends on a range of case-specific factors, including his education or
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S Ct. 1019. Although warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding
to trial uncounseled must be "rigorously" conveyed, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S Ct. 2389; see Faretta v. California, 422 US. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S Ct. 2525, a less
searching or formal colloquy may suffice at earlier stages of the criminal process, 487 U.S., at 299, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. In Patterson, this Court described a pragmatic approach to right-to-counsel
waivers, one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in
question, and what assistance [counsel] could provide to an accused at that stage." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Less rigorous warnings are required pretrial because, at that stage, "the full dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious [*6] to an accused than
they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389. Pp. 8-11.
(b) The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two admonitions ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court. "The
law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances .. .."
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450. Even if the defendant lacked a
full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, the State may
nevertheless prevail if it shows that the information provided to the defendant satisfied the constitutional
minimum. Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Iowa high court gave
insufficient consideration to this Court's guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding
them necessary in every guilty plea instance, that court overlooked this Court's observations that the
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend upon the particular facts and
circumstances in each case, Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Moreover, as
Tovar acknowledges, [*7] in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden
to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Tovar has never claimed
that he did not fully understand the 1996 OWI charge or the range of punishment for that crime prior to
pleading guilty. He has never "articulated with precision" the additional information counsel could have
provided, given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct.
2389. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment.
Before this Court, he suggests only that he may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to
counsel at trial, but not if he was, instead, going to plead guilty. Given "the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding [this] case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019, it is
far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened
Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the two
admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him, [*8] i.e., the
warnings might be misconstrued to convey that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could
plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain
hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt
disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or
the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. States are free to
adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful, but
the Federal Constitution does not require the two admonitions here in controversy. Pp. 11-15.
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JUDGES: GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
OPINIONBY: GINSBURG
OPINION:
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all
critical stages of the criminal process. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477 (1985)] United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967). [*9] The
entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a "critical stage" at which the
right to counsel adheres. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US 25, 34, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S Ct. 2006 (1972)\
White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the
right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a "knowing, intelligent
act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before
accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation.
Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to
be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that
"waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense
will be overlooked"; and (2) "admonish" the defendant "that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on [*10] whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is
wise to plead guilty"? 656 N. W.2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003). The Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings
essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Ibid.
We hold that neither warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty
plea.
I
On November 2, 1996, respondent Felipe Edgardo Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was
arrested in Ames, Iowa, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI). See Iowa
Code § 321J.2 (1995). nl An intoxilyzer test administered the night of Tovar's arrest showed he had a
blood alcohol level of 0.194. App. 24. The arresting officer informed Tovar of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602 (1966). Tovar signed a form stating that he waived
those rights and agreed to answer questions. Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public [*11] Safety, OWI
Supplemental Report 3 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner; Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety,
Rights Warnings (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner.

nl "A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor
vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage . ... b. While having an alcohol concentration . . . of .10 or more." Iowa Code §
32112(1) (1995).
Some hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County.
The judge indicated on the Initial Appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived
application for court-appointed counsel. Initial Appearance in No. OWCR 23989 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging
of Petitioner. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar was "informed of the charge and his
. . . rights and received a copy of the Complaint." Ibid. Arraignment was set for November 18, 1996. In the
interim, [*12] Tovar was released from jail.

At the November 18 arraignment, n2 the court's inquiries of Tovar began: "Mr. Tovar appears without
counsel and I see, Mr. Tovar, that you waived application for a court appointed attorney. Did you want to
represent yourself at today's hearing?" App. 8-9. Tovar replied: "Yes, sir." Id., at 9. The court soon after
asked: "How did you wish to plead?" Tovar answered: "Guilty." Ibid. Tovar affirmed that he had not been
promised anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty. Id., at 13-14.

n2 Tovar appeared in court along with four other individuals charged with misdemeanor
offenses. App. 6-10. The presiding judge proposed to conduct the plea proceeding for the five cases
jointly, and each of the individuals indicated he did not object to that course of action. Id., at 11.
Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule
Crim. Proc. 8 (1992), n3 the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, [*13] he would be entitled
to a speedy and public trial by jury, App. 15, and would have the right to be represented at that trial by an
attorney, who "could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present
evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf," id., at 16. By
pleading guilty, the court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of any kind on the
charge against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be represented by an attorney at that trial." Ibid. The
court further advised Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain silent at
trial, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and compel their
testimony. Id., at 16-19.

n3 The Rule has since been renumbered 2.8.
Turning to the particular offense with which Tovar had been charged, the court informed him that an
OWI conviction carried a maximum penalty [*14] of a year in jail and a $ 1,000 fine, and a minimum
penalty of two days in jail and a $ 500 fine. Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed that he understood his exposure to
those penalties. Ibid. The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure
itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense. Id., at 21-22. To that end, the court informed
Tovar that the OWI charge had only two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was operating a
motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, when he did so, he was intoxicated. Id., at 23. Tovar confirmed
that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute the
results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood alcohol
level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. Id., at 23-24.
After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar if he still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that
he did. Id., at 27-28. The court then accepted Tovar's plea, observing that there was "a factual basis" for it,
and that Tovar had made the plea "voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, [*15] [and] . . . of
the consequences of [pleading guilty]." Id., at 28.
On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for sentencing on the OWI charge n4 and, simultaneously, for
arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license. Id., at 45-46; see Iowa Code §
321J.21 (1995). n5 Noting that Tovar was again in attendance without counsel, the court inquired: "Mr.
Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an
attorney to represent you?" App. 46. n6 Tovar replied that he would represent himself. Ibid. The court then
engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the suspension charge as it had on the OWI charge the
previous month. Id., at 48-51. After accepting Tovar's guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court
sentenced him on both counts: For the OWI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two
days in jail and a $ 500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension conviction, the court imposed a
$ 250 fine, plus a surcharge and costs. Id., at 55.

n4 At that stage, it was still open to Tovar to request withdrawal of his guilty plea on the OWI
charge and to substitute a plea of not guilty. See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992). [*16]

n5 In order to appear at the OWI arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse despite the
suspension of his license; he was apprehended en route home. App. 50, 53.
n6 Prior to asking Tovar whether he wished to hire counsel, the court noted that Tovar had
applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his application had been denied because he was
financially dependent upon his parents. Id., at 46. Tovar does not here challenge the absence of
counsel at sentencing.
On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of OWI for a second time. He was represented by counsel in
that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 24, n. 1.
On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a third offense, see Iowa
Code § 321J.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while license barred, see § 321.561. Iowa law
classifies first-offense OWI as a serious misdemeanor and second-offense OWI as an aggravated
misdemeanor. § § 321J.2(2)(a)-(b). Third-offense OWI, and any OWI offenses thereafter, rank as class
"D" felonies. § 321J.2(2)(c). Represented [*17] by an attorney, Tovar pleaded not guilty to both December
2000 charges. Record 55.
In March 2001, through counsel, Tovar filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law Points; then7 motion
urged that Tovar's first OWI conviction, in 1996, could not be used to enhance the December 2000 OWI
charge from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. App. 3-5. n8 Significantly,
Tovar did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996 arraignment of his right to counsel prior to
pleading guilty and at the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid not "full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" — because he "was never made aware by the court... of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id., at 3-4.

n7 See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 10(2) (1992) ("Any defense, objection, or request which is
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by
motion."); State v. Wilt, 333 N. W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for
adjudication of law points under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material facts are
undisputed). [*18]

n8 Tovar conceded that the 1998 OWI conviction could be used for enhancement purposes.
Record 60.
The court denied Tovar's motion in May 2001, explaining: "Where the offense is readily understood by
laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only
that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to counsel and a willingness to proceed without
counsel in the face of such awareness." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37 (brackets in original). Tovar then
waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the court of both the OWI third-offense charge and
driving while license barred. Id., at 33. Four months after that adjudication, Tovar was sentenced. On the
OWI third-offense charge, he received a 180-day jail term, with all but 30 days suspended, three years of
probation, and a $ 2,500 fine plus surcharges and costs. App. 70-71. For driving while license barred, Tovar
received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the OWI sentence, and a suspended S 500 fine. Id., at
71.
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, [*19] App. to Pet. for Cert. 23-30, but the Supreme Court of
Iowa, by a 4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first
OWI conviction, 656 N. W.2d 112 (2003). Iowa's highest court acknowledged that "the dangers of
proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a
jury trial, [therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be different." Id., at 119. The court
nonetheless held that the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been
constitutionally inadequate, and instructed dispositively:

"[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be
advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.... The trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that
there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving
the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be
overlooked. [*20] The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise
to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges
against him and the range of allowable punishments." Id., at 121. n9

n9 The dissenting justices criticized the majority's approach as "rigid" and out of line with the
pragmatic approach this Court described in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988). 656 N. W. 2d, at 122. They noted that, in addition to advice concerning
the constitutional rights a guilty plea relinquishes, Tovar was "made fully aware of the penal
consequences that might befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty." Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. , 156 L. Ed. 2d 703, 124 S. Ct. 44(2003), in view of the division of
opinion on the requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes for waiver of counsel [*21] at a plea hearing,
compare, e.g., United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146-1147 (CA9 2002), with State v. Cashman, 491
N. W.2d 462, 465-466 (S. D. 1992), and we now reverse the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court.
II
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical
stages" of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct.
477\ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926. A plea hearing qualifies as
a "critical stage." White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050. Because Tovar
received a two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage
and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d
530, 92 S. Ct. 2006.
A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation. While the Constitution
"does not force a lawyer upon a defendant," Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87
L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942), it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent, [*22] see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019
(1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI plea hearing, was
insufficiently informed, and therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did
not elaborate on the value, at that stage of the case, of an attorney's advice and the dangers of selfrepresentation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent 15. nlO

nlO The United States as amicus curiae reads our decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59
L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), to hold that a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a
misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term of imprisonment, affords no
ground for disturbing the underlying conviction. Amicus accordingly contends that the Constitution
should not preclude use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance the penalty for a
subsequent offense, regardless of the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 11, n. 3. The State, however, does not contest the Iowa Supreme Court's
determination that a conviction obtained without an effective waiver of counsel cannot be used to
enhance a subsequent charge. See ibid. We therefore do not address arguments amicus advances
questioning that premise. See also id., at 29, n. 12.

[*23]
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant "knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open." Adams, 317 U.S., at 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236. We have not,
however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed

without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election, our
decisions indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See
Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019.
As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se,
he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562,
95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in Faretta resisted counsel's aid, preferring to represent
himself. The Court held that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that right,
however, we cautioned: "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in
order competently [*24] and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing
" Id., at 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988), we elaborated
on "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to which Faretta referred. "At trial," we
observed, "counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and
evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively . . .,
object to improper prosecution questions, and much more." 487 U.S., at 299, n. 13, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108
S. Ct. 2389. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel, we therefore said, must be
"rigorously" conveyed. Id, at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We clarified, however, that at
earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice. Id., at 299, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 261,108S. Ct. 2389.
Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we
held, the warnings required [*25] by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602
(1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment rights, but of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as well. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Miranda
warnings, we said, effectively convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning. In
addition, they inform him of the "ultimate adverse consequence" of making uncounseled admissions, i.e.,
his statements may be used against him in any ensuing criminal proceeding. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Miranda warnings, we added, "also sufficed . . . to let [the defendant] know what
a lawyer could 'do for him,"' namely, advise him to refrain from making statements that could prove
damaging to his defense. 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389.
Patterson describes a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," one that asks "what purposes a
lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide
to an accused at that stage," in order "to determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and
the type of warnings and procedures that should be required before a waiver [*26] of that right will be
recognized." Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We require less rigorous warnings pretrial,
Patterson explained, not because pretrial proceedings are "less important" than trial, but because, at that
stage, "the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious to
an accused than they are at trial." Id., at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Tovar's case, the State maintains that, like the Miranda warnings we found adequate in Patterson,
Iowa's plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure that his guilty
plea is informed and voluntary. Brief for Petitioner 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to
the State, "makes plain that an attorney's role would be to challenge the charge or sentence," and therefore
adequately conveys to the defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of self-representation. Brief
for Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other hand, defends the precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme
Court, see supra, at 7-8, as essential to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea stage [*27] waiver of
counsel. Brief for Respondent 15.
To resolve this case, we need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the plea colloquy
was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more
in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel at his Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed
that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see supra, at 3, and declined the court's offer of
"time to hire an attorney" at sentencing, when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea, see
supra, at 4-5, and n. 4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant must be alerted to his right to the

assistance of counsel in entering a plea. See Brief for Petitioner 19 (acknowledging defendant's need to
know "retained or appointed counsel can assist" at the plea stage by "working on the issues of guilt and
sentencing"). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume that Tovar was informed of his
entitlement to counsel's aid or, at least, to have pretermitted that issue. See 656 N. W. 2d, at 117.
Accordingly, the State presents a narrower question: "Does the Sixth Amendment [*28] require a court to
give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an
attorney, that an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that
without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense?" Pet. for Cert. i.
Training on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, the particular language the Iowa Supreme Court
employed in announcing the warnings it thought the Sixth Amendment required: "The trial judge [must]
advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by
laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the
risk that a viable defense will be overlooked," 656 N. W. 2d, at 127; in addition, "the defendant should be
admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent
opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty," ibid. Tovar did not
receive such advice, and the sole question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment compels the two
admonitions here in controversy. [*29] nl 1 We hold it does not.

nl 1 The Supreme Court of Iowa also held that "the court must ensure the defendant understands
the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments." 656 N. W. 2d, at 121.
The parties do not dispute that Tovar was so informed.
This Court recently explained, in reversing a lower court determination that a guilty plea was not
voluntary: "The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
circumstances — even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking
it." United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450 (2002) (emphasis in
original). We similarly observed in Patterson: "If [the defendant] . . . lacked a full and complete
appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that
the information it provided [*30] to him satisfied the constitutional minimum." 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed.
2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa Supreme Court gave insufficient
consideration to these guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in
every guilty plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the
information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will "depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S.
Ct. 1019;supra, at9.
Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the
defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of
counsel. See Watts v. State, 257 N. W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977); Brief for Respondent 5, 26-27. In that light,
we note that Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment
for the crime prior to pleading guilty. Further, he has never "articulated with precision" the additional
information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the [*31] charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S.,
at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; supra, at 4. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right
to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he "may have been
under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead
guilty." Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added). nl2

nl2 The trial court's comment that Tovar appeared without counsel at the arraignment and the
court's inquiry whether Tovar wanted to represent himself at that hearing, see App. 8-9, hardly lend
support to Tovar's suggestion of what he "may have" believed. See also id., at 46 (court's inquiry at
sentencing whether Tovar "wanted to take some time to hire an attorney"); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8
(2)(a) (1992) ("at any time before judgment," defendant may request withdrawal of guilty plea and
substitution of not guilty plea).

Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case," see Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464,
82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 [*32] it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa
Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In
a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might
confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court
declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that
the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays
his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal
charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the
defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be
wasted. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28-29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21.
We note, finally, that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance
of an uncounseled plea they deem useful. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a) [*33] (2003); Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.111(d) (2003); Md. Ct. Rule 4-215 (2002); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 5.02 (2003); Pa. Rule
Crim. Proc. 121, comment (2003). We hold only that the two admonitions the Iowa Supreme Court ordered
are not required by the Federal Constitution.
***
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
11 Benjamin Frank Lucero (Petitioner) appeals the district court ! s
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that
while he was before the Murray City Justice Court (Justice Court), he
was not properly advised of his constitutional right to counsel, and
consequently did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
counsel before pleading guilty to driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI) in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-44
(Supp. 2003). Petitioner argues that the record in the Justice Court
is insufficient to allow a determination of whether the required
colloquy between the Justice Court and Petitioner occurred and that
the trial court should not have considered evidence outside the
record.
12 The Justice Court responds by first arguing that neither the
district court nor this court has jurisdiction to hear this case
because Petitioner failed to file a timely appeal to the district
court for a trial de novo. The Justice Court further argues that if
there is jurisdiction there was sufficient evidence on the record and
through proffered and sworn testimony, for the district court to
conclude that Petitioner was advised of his rights, and properly
waived his right to counsel. We affirm the district court's decision,
but on other grounds.

BACKGROUND
13 Petitioner was charged in the Justice Court-^- with DUI, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-44
(Supp. 2003), and improper usage of lanes, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-61 (1998). At a bench
trial, Petitioner appeared pro se. After pleading guilty to DUI, the
charge of improper usage of lanes was dismissed. On June 4, 2002,
Petitioner was sentenced to a jail term of 180 days, ordered to pay a
fine, and placed on probation for eighteen months. Petitioner did not
file an appeal of his conviction to the district court within the
thirty days required by law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1) (2002).
However, on August 1, 2002, Petitioner filed, in the Third District
Court, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or, in the alternative,
Motion to Correct Illegally Imposed Sentence under Rules 65B and 65C
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This petition sought an
extraordinary writ granting his immediate release on the grounds that
Petitioner was not represented by counsel, had not waived his right
to counsel, and was sentenced in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
14 The Justice Court held a review hearing on September 10, 2002,
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where it suspended Petitioner's remaining jail sentence and released
him from custody. Six days later, in the Third District Court, a
hearing took place on Petitioner's petition for post-conviction
relief. At this hearing, rather than challenging his plea or
conviction, Petitioner requested that his suspended sentence be
vacated.
55 After testimony from Petitioner, proffered testimony of the
Justice Court judge, and submission of affidavit testimony of two
Justice Court clerks, the district court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law stating that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to be represented by counsel when he entered his
plea. Petitioner filed a timely appeal to this court for review of
the district court's order.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
16 Petitioner challenges the district court's dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the record was
insufficient. The Justice Court asserts the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the petition. In addition, the Justice Court
argues the district court properly found no violation of Petitioner's
Sixth Amendment rights. "We review an appeal from an order dismissing
or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Rudolph
v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,54, 43 P.3d 467.

ANALYSIS

I. Appellate Review of Justice Courts
11 We first discuss the Justice Court's argument that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner did
not first appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. Rule 65C
(g)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs the district
court, upon receiving a petition for post-conviction relief, to first
review the petition to ensure that the claims have not been
previously adjudicated, or that the claims are not frivolous. If the
court finds that the petition is not properly raised, the court is
required to summarily dismiss the claims. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)
(1) . Additionally, Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106(1) (c)
(2002) precludes post-conviction relief when a claim "could have been
but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Id. In Hutchinqs v. State,
2003 UT 52,114, 84 P.3d 1150, the Utah Supreme Court noted that rule
65C complements section 78-35a-106 and is "designed to balance the
'requirements of fairness and due process against the public's
interest in the efficient adjudication . . . of post-conviction

x t*£,V ~T V^JL

1 U

relief cases.'" I_cL_ (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l)). Therefore, a
district court has jurisdiction over a petition for post-conviction
relief in order to determine its procedural correctness.
58 In this case, it is unclear from the record whether the
district court conducted this preliminary review required by rule
65C. It is clear, however, that the district court did not summarily
dismiss the petition under rule 65C, but held a hearing on the
merits, received evidence, and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dismissing the petition.-^- As a result, the
district court correctly assumed jurisdiction over Petitioner's
petition. The remaining question is whether the district court should
have summarily dismissed the petition for failure to comply with rule
65C and section 78-35a-106.
59 The Justice Court argues that Petitioner was required to pursue
a direct appeal before seeking post-conviction relief.-^- The Utah
Constitution provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have . . . the right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, §
12. For criminal cases originating in justice courts, a defendant is
provided an appeal through "a trial de novo in the district court."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1) (2002). In a trial de novo, the district
court is "not acting in a typical appellate capacity." State v.
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because justice
courts are not courts of record, "the 'appeal1 does not involve a
review of the justice court proceedings." Id. at 275. Through a trial
de novo in the district court, "the parties essentially get a fresh
start," and the case is tried again as if it originated there. Dean
v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 50,59, 975 P.2d 946 (quotations and citation
omitted). The district court's judgment after trial de novo is final
and may not be appealed either to this court or the Utah Supreme
Court absent an issue regarding the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7); Hinson, 966 P.2d at 276.
"[I]n Utah, . . . it is settled that the right to an 'appeal' from a
court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de novo in
a court of record." City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,
516 (Utah 1990).
510 In this case, after being sentenced, Petitioner chose not to
appeal his plea or conviction to the district court for a trial de
novo. It is clear, however, that a trial de novo would have remedied
any constitutional defects suffered by Petitioner in the Justice
Court. Instead, nearly two months after sentencing in the Justice
Court, Petitioner filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with
the district court.
511 "A petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral attack
on a conviction and sentence and is not a substitute for direct
appellate review." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,55, 43 P.3d 467. The
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Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated sections 78-35a-101
to -110 (2002), precludes post-conviction relief when a claim "could
have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. §
78-35a-106 (1) (c). The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated this
prohibition, but with one exception. "[I]ssues that were not
addressed on direct appeal but could have been raised may not be
raised for the first time in a post-conviction relief proceeding
absent unusual circumstances." Rudolph, 2002 UT 7, at 55 (emphasis
added). The supreme court further defined unusual circumstances as
those that "show that there was an obvious injustice or a substantial
and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Carter v. Galetka,
2001 UT 96,515, 44 P.3d 626 (quotations and citation omitted); see
also Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978) (stating that
exigent circumstances exist where there "has been such unfairness or
failure to accord due process of law that it would be wholly
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction" (footnote omitted)).
512 Petitioner argues that his inability to have the Justice
Court's denial of counsel reviewed by the district court on a direct
appeal is unique and presents "unusual circumstances" with an
"obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right" warranting review. Carter, 2001 UT 96 at 115
(quotation and citations omitted). However, we are not persuaded that
Petitioner, in fact, suffered from an obvious injustice. To the
contrary, the structure of Utah's justice court system ensures that
when a defendant believes he or she has been deprived of a
constitutional right by a justice court, that individual is entitled
to a new trial in the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120
(1) (2002); Henriod, 1999 UT App 50 at 59. Voluntarily eschewing the
opportunity to remedy a constitutional violation through a trial de
novo does not create unusual circumstances permitting a petition for
post-conviction relief. By rejecting a trial de novo, Petitioner
acceded to any undesired result of the Justice Court's sentence. ^ Therefore, we hold that Petitioner did not suffer a "substantial and
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right," Carter, 2001 UT 96 at
515 (quotations and citations omitted), because he had the
opportunity to remedy his alleged denial of counsel, and chose not to
pursue that opportunity.-^- Because we conclude that the unusual
circumstances exception does not apply in this case, Petitioner was
precluded under Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106 from obtaining
relief through a petition for post-conviction relief. Given our
holding that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner's
petition for post-conviction relief and our disposition of this case
on that ground, we do not address the correctness of the trial
court's findings and conclusions.

CONCLUSION

113 Petitioner failed to file a timely appeal to the district
court for a trial de novo. A trial de novo would have remedied any
constitutional violations Petitioner may have suffered in the Justice
Court. After obtaining counsel, or properly waiving his right to
counsel, Petitioner could have either pleaded guilty again, or
challenged the charges in a trial. Defendant has not demonstrated
unusual circumstances consisting of "an obvious injustice or
substantial prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Carter,
2001 UT 96 at 115. Thus, he has not established an exception to the
rule prohibiting post-conviction relief when the petitioner has not
first sought relief by direct appeal. We
accordingly affirm the result of the district court, but for the
reasons explained above.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

114 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
115 I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
I. The District Court's Jurisdiction to
Hear a Petition for Extraordinary Relief
116 It is unquestionably true that a defendant's right to appeal a
justice court conviction to a district court for a trial de novo
satisfies the various state and federal constitutional guarantees
relating to due process and the right to appeal. See, e.g., North v.
Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 337, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 2713 (1976); City of
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). The
question before us, however, is not one of constitutional propriety,
but is instead a question of statutory interpretation. Specifically,
the question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear
Lucero's petition for post-conviction relief hinges upon our
reconciliation of two different statutory provisions. The first is

Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120 (Supp. 2002) , which dictates the
manner by which defendants can appeal justice court convictions. That
section is entitled "Appeals from justice court," and provides that,
"[i]n a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in
the district court." Id^ § 78-5-120(1). The second is Utah Code
Annotated section 78-35a-106 (1996), which establishes the means by
which a defendant can petition for post-conviction relief under the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a106 to -110 (1996). Section 78-35a-106(1) states that "[a] person is
not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: (a)
may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial
motion." (Emphasis added.) The question before us, then, is whether a
trial de novo qualifies as a "direct appeal." Id. The majority
concludes that it does, and therefore rules that Lucerofs failure to
file for a trial de novo precludes him from petitioning for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. I disagree.
fl7 I first examine the meaning of the phrase "direct appeal."
There is no provision in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act that
specifically defines what constitutes a "direct appeal" for purposes
of section 78-35a-106, nor is there a provision anywhere in the Utah
Code defining that specific phrase for purposes of any other
particular statutory scheme.-^- Accordingly, we must interpret the
meaning of this phrase using the accepted rules of statutory
interpretation. "When interpreting statutes, we determine the
statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language,
and give effect to the plain language unless the language is
ambiguous." Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm f n, 2004
UT 11,517, 84 P.3d 1197. As I see it, a party receives a "direct
appeal" when an appellate tribunal conducts a case-specific, rulingspecific review of the lower court proceedings. This understanding
comports with the limited discussion that this phrase has received in
various Utah courts. See, e.g., Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of
Adjustment, 2002 UT 77,1518-19, 52 P.3d 1267 (referring to a "direct
appeal" as a "direct review"); see also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT
22,f25, 70 P.3d 111 (distinguishing "direct appeals" from collateral
attacks). Accordingly, Utah courts have used the phrase "direct
appeal" to refer to a variety of situations in which appellate
tribunals undertook a case-specific, ruling-specific review of the
proceedings below. See, e.g., Hutchinqs v. State, 2003 UT 52,116, 84
P.3d 1150 (referring to an appellate review of a probation revocation
as a "direct appeal"); Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128,16, 63 P.3d 672
(stating that such issues as the validity of a search warrant, the
admissibility of a confession, and the correctness of a bindover
order are reviewable on "direct appeal"); Salazar v. Utah State
Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 n.6 (Utah 1993) (referring to an appellate
review of a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as a "direct
appeal"). Applied to the present case, a trial de novo would
therefore only constitute a "direct appeal" of the justice court
conviction if it provided the district court with the opportunity to
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conduct a case-specific, ruling-specific review of the justice court
proceedings.
518 I now turn to the scope of review provided by a "trial de
novo." In Pledger v. Cox, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
words fde novo1 . . . have at least two possible interpretations when
applied to judicial review . . . : ! (1) A complete retrial upon new
evidence; and (2) a trial upon the record made before the lower
tribunal.1" 626 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1981) (quoting Denver & R.G.W.R.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm T n, 98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552 (1940)).
Though "[t]he meaning of ftrial de novo' in each statute is obviously
dictated by the wording and context of the statute in which it
appears," id., a trial de novo that is conducted following a
defendant's justice court conviction follows the first definition—
that of a "complete retrial upon new evidence." Id. This comports
with the definition offered by Black's Law Dictionary, wherein "trial
de novo" is defined as "[a] new trial on the entire case—that is, on
both questions of fact and issues of law." Black's Law Dictionary
1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999). Thus, "[b]ecause a justice of the peace
court in this state is not a court of record, an appeal from that
court is by way of a trial de novo in the district court, rather than
a review of the justice's rulings." Wisden v. District Ct., 694 P. 2d
605, 606 (Utah 1984).
119 Because it acts "as if there had been no trial in the first
instance," Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999), a
district court conducting a trial de novo "is not confined to the
record before the justice court and need not defer to the justice
court's findings and determinations. The district court neither
reverses nor affirms the judgment of the justice court, but renders a
new, distinct, and independent judgment." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d
273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). When a district court conducts a trial
de novo review of a justice court conviction, "the case [stands]
precisely as it would have at that stage of the proceedings if it had
begun in that court in the first instance." Id. ; accord Dean v.
Henriod, 1999 UT App 50,19 n.l, 975 P.2d 946.^-

520 When confronted with possible statutory conflicts that might
preclude a defendant from seeking post-conviction relief, "any
ambiguity that may exist . . . should be resolved in favor of a
criminal defendant." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990).
Against this backdrop, I think that the majority's decision to deny
Lucero post-conviction relief based on his failure to request a trial
de novo is simply incorrect. Had Lucero requested a trial de novo,
the district court would have been required to act as if "the
proceedings had begun in that court in the first instance." Hinson,
966 P.2d at 276. As such, Lucero would not have had the opportunity
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to focus his "appeal" on the particular legal conclusions or factual
findings of the justice court that he believed were erroneous.
Lucerofs trial de novo would not have been a framed, particularized
proceeding that was directed at the review of specific alleged
errors; instead, the district court conducting the trial de novo
would have acted as a broad, general tribunal that would have
examined the charges anew. Insofar as this avenue of appeal would
simply not have given Lucero the opportunity to directly challenge
any alleged errors below, I think it clear that the trial de novo
cannot be regarded as a "direct appeal. "-^121 As I see it, the plain language of the statutory scheme thus
provides a defendant who has been convicted in a justice court
proceeding with two separate avenues of relief. First, the defendant
can exercise his statutory right to file for a trial de novo. The
advantages of this course would be clear: though the defendant would
not have the opportunity to have the trial court review any potential
errors that occurred below, the defendant would have the opportunity
under this fresh start to try and persuade a new finder of fact of
his or her innocence. Should the defendant choose not to file for a
trial de novo, however, the defendant is still allowed to petition a
district court for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act. In this hearing, the trial court would have the
authority to directly review the proceedings in the justice court to
determine whether any constitutional error occurred.-^- In this case,
Lucero properly and validly chose the second option, and the trial
court correctly determined that it did have jurisdiction to hear the
merits of Lucerofs petition for post-conviction relief. I would
accordingly conclude that the majority's reversal of that threshold
determination is in error.

II. Lucero's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
SI22 Because of my conclusion that Lucero did have a right to
petition for post-conviction relief, I think that we are obligated to
review the district court's determination that Lucerofs waiver of the
right to counsel at the justice court proceeding was constitutionally
valid. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, I would
conclude that Lucero did not validly waive his right to counsel and
that the district court's denial of Lucero's petition for postconviction relief should accordingly be reversed.
123 "The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously
protected by the trial court." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917
(Utah 1998). "Because of the importance of the right to counsel and
the heavy burden placed upon the trial court to protect this right,
there is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver
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must be resolved in the defendant's favor." Id. However, because the
right to assistance of counsel is "personal in nature," State v.
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987), the right "may be waived by
a competent accused if the waiver is 'knowingly and intelligently1
made." Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d
629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Further, the relevant Utah cases
establish that there is a distinction between the "knowingly" and the
"intelligently" prongs of the waiver test.
"Intelligent" in this context means "only that the defendant has been
provided with adequate information on which to make his or her selfrepresentation choice. Because such a choice is seldom, if ever, a
wise one, 'intelligent1 does not carry that meaning here." "Knowing"
refers to a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel,
similar to a defendant's competence to stand trial . . . .
State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations
omitted).
524 Before determining that a defendant has knowingly and
intelligently waived his or her right to counsel, a trial court has
an affirmative duty to "conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant"
in order to ensure "that the defendant's waiver of counsel is
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Heaton, 958 P.2d at
918. Though a colloquy on the record is not required, see State v.
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159,5520-22, 27 P.3d 573, it is "the preferred
method of ascertaining the validity of a waiver because it insures
that defendants understand the risks of self-representation."
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. "Where there is no colloquy, [appellate
courts] 'will look at any evidence in the record'" created in the
district court in order to ascertain whether the district court has
fulfilled its duty of inquiry. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159 at 122
(quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188).-^-

525 In explaining the contours of this required inquiry, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that the defendant "should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"
prior to the trial court's acceptance of a waiver of the right to
counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525,
2541 (1974). In accordance with the United States Supreme Court's
unquestioned authority over questions of federal constitutional law,
Utah courts have long enforced the Faretta directive as part of the
Sixth Amendment analysis. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; Frampton, 737
P.2d at 188; State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981); State
v. Dominquez, 564 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1977); State v. Petty, 2001
UT App 396,58,
38 P.3d 998; Valencia, 2001 UT App 159 at 522; McDonald, 922 P.2d at

779; Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 633.-^
126 The proper scope of the Faretta directive was recently
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Iowa v. Tovar, 541
U.S. , 124 S. Ct. 1379, 2004 U.S. Lexis 1837, * (2004).-^- In Tovar,
the defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. See id. at *10. An intoxilyzer test
administered the night of the defendant's arrest showed that he had a
blood alcohol level that was well above the legal limit. See id. At
his arraignment, the defendant informed the court that he wished to
waive his right to counsel and that he wished to plead guilty. See
id. at *12. The court accordingly conducted a plea colloquy in which
the court explained that the defendant had the right to be
represented at trial by an attorney who "could help [the defendant]
select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses,
present evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the
judge and jury on [his] behalf." Id. at *12-13 (second and third
alterations in original). After receiving this and other warnings,
the defendant affirmed his wish to waive his right to counsel and to
plead guilty. See id. at *14.
127 Several years later, the defendant was arrested for a third
DUI offense, and accordingly sought to challenge his prior guilty
plea as a means of avoiding a recidivist sentence enhancement. See
id. at *16-17. After proceeding through the lower Iowa courts, the
Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the original waiver was
constitutionally invalid due to the fact that the defendant had not
been informed of "the dangers of self-representation." Id. at *19
(quotations and citation omitted).
128 On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
See id. at *33. In reversing, the Court held that "[t]he information
a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election . .
. will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the
defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily
grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding." Id.
at *23 (emphasis added). While the Faretta directive is still
required before a court accepts a waiver of counsel before trial, see
id. at *23-24, "at the earlier stages of the criminal process, a less
searching or formal colloquy may suffice." 16^ at *24. Quoting prior
precedent, the Court explained that "[w]e require less rigorous
warnings pretrial . . . not because pretrial proceedings are 'less
important' than trial, but because, at that stage, 'the full dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial
and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.'" I_d_. at *26
(quotations and citations omitted).
129 Endorsing a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," id.
at *25 (quotations and citations omitted), the Court ultimately
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concluded that the inquiry must rest on "the particular facts and
circumstances" of each case. See id. at *3. Analyzing the Tovar
litigation, the Court concluded that there was not a "realistic"
"prospect" that a "meritorious defense" would have existed for Tovar
at trial or that the defendant could have pled "to a lesser charge."
Id. at *32. Because "the admonitions at issue might confuse or
mislead a defendant [in such a scenario] more than they would inform
him," id., the Court ultimately concluded that the lower court did
not err by failing to inform Tovar of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation.
230 Counsel for the Murray City Justice Court argues that Tovar
mandates affirmance in the present case. I disagree with that
proposition. While it may be true that Tovar will require a
reexamination of our "dangers and disadvantages" jurisprudence, at
least as applied to waivers at a plea hearing, the facts of the
present case do not require such a reexamination here. As discussed
above, the Tovar ruling was expressly predicated on the unquestioned
evidence that Tovar would have had no "realistic" alternatives to
pleading guilty. Id. at *32. Further, the trial court in Tovar did
conduct an on-record colloquy in which the court advised Tovar of
some of the advantages that having an attorney would have offered.
See id. at *13. In the present case, however, there is a complete
absence of evidence from which we could similarly conclude that
Lucero lacked a realistic prospect of success at trial or in
negotiations with prosecutors. There is likewise no evidence that
Lucero was informed by the justice court of any of the advantages of
having counsel present at the hearing. Our supreme court has
previously held that "there is a presumption against waiver." Heaton,
958 P.2d at 917. Given this presumption, I think that we are
obligated to conclude that Lucero was not informed of how the right
to counsel would have applied "in general in the circumstances,"
Tovar, 2004 U.S. Lexis 1837 at *29 (emphasis omitted), and that
Lucerofs waiver of the right to counsel was thus invalid. As such, I
would reverse the district court's dismissal of Lucerofs petition for
post-conviction relief.

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Under Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-101 (2002), justice courts
are courts "not of record."
2. The Justice Court likewise argues that this court does not have
jurisdiction over this case. However, the court of appeals has
jurisdiction to review a district court's denial of a petition for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a3(2) (f) (2002). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(o).
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3. Petitioner argues that because the Justice Court did not raise
this issue before the district court, it is now barred because it
would constitute an alternative ground for affirmance not apparent on
the record nor sustainable by the factual findings. See State v.
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,19, 76 P.3d 1159. However, "[jJurisdictional
issues may be raised for the first time on appeal." M.M.J, v. R.N.J.,
908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, Petitioner's
argument is moot because we have determined the district court had
jurisdiction.
4. Through his post-conviction relief petition, Petitioner does not
challenge the Justice Court plea or conviction. Instead, for reasons
not apparent to this court, he seeks only a dismissal of the
remaining suspended sentence.
5. The Justice Court also argues that Petitioner should be precluded
from bringing a petition for post-conviction relief because he did
not explain why he failed to take a direct appeal. In support of this
argument, it cites Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), and Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987), where
the courts held that in addition to showing an obvious injustice, the
defendants were required to explain why they did not take a direct
appeal. However, Summers and Wells were both decided prior to the
enactment of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated
sections 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002), which does not require such an
initial showing of why a direct appeal was not taken. We note that
even though a defendant is not required to explain why he did not
bring a direct appeal, such an explanation may be helpful in showing
extraordinary circumstances.
1. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "direct appeal" as "[a]n appeal
from a trial court's decision directly to the jurisdiction's highest
court, thus bypassing review by an intermediate appellate court."
Black's Law Dictionary 94 (7th ed. deluxe 1999). A review of the Utah
cases, however, indicates that this strict definition is not followed
by our courts. In Pascual v. Carver, for example, the Utah Supreme
Court referred to the defendant's prior appeal, which had been heard
in the Utah Court of Appeals, as a "direct appeal" of the conviction.
876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). Similarly, in State v. Lara, we
referred to an appeal of a bindover order that was heard in this
court as a "direct appeal." 2003 UT App 318,120, 79 P.3d 951.
2. Given this construct, Utah courts have insisted that though a
district court exercises its "appellate jurisdiction" when conducting
a trial de novo, State v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), the trials de novo that are held before the district courts
must not be characterized in the same manner as a standard appeal
which is held before the court of appeals or supreme court. In State
v. Hinson, this court clearly drew this distinction, therein
declaring that certain rules governing a case filed "[i]n a
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conventional appeal environment . . . [have] no place in an appeal
from a justice court judgment." 966 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) . Similarly, we emphasized in Dean v. Henriod that there is a
distinction between a "traditional appeal" and "an appeal from
justice court." 1999 UT App 50,319 n.l, 975 P.2d 946. Thus, when a
district court conducts a trial de novo, the district court is "not
acting in a typical appellate capacity." Hinson, 966 P.2d at 276. In
a related context, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that, because
a district court has the authority to make findings of fact in its
trial de novo review of Industrial Commission decisions, the district
court should be viewed "as an independent fact finder and not as an
intermediate appellate court." University of Utah v. Industrial
Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) (emphasis omitted).
3. There is some confusion as to whether Murray City Justice Court's
argument is predicated on Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-106(1)
(a) (1996) (precluding relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
where the petition is based on a ground that "may still be raised on
direct appeal") or whether it is instead predicated on Utah Code
Annotated section 78-35a-106(1)(c) (1996) (precluding relief under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act where the petition is based on a
ground that "could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal"). Though Murray City Justice Court's brief did not specify
which of these subsections its argument was predicated on, the brief
did directly discuss Utah Code Annotated section 78-35a-102(1)
(1996), which states that relief is appropriate where a defendant has
"exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct
appeal." (Emphasis added.) Given this reference, and given the
repeated references throughout the remainder of the brief to Lucero's
failure to exercise his rights to a "direct appeal," I think it clear
that any specific argument arising under Utah Code Annotated section
78-35a-106 (1) (c) is not properly before us.
Even were we to consider the subtle differences embodied by
section 78-35a-106(1)(c), however, I think that the result here would
be the same. As discussed above, though the trial de novo is
considered to be the form by which a defendant can "appeal" his or
her justice court conviction, it is still nevertheless true that the
district court conducting the trial de novo cannot consider any
particular claims of error that might have arisen below. Thus,
insofar as the defendant in such circumstances cannot "raise" any
issues in his "appeal," I think that the result under either section
78-35a-106(1) (a) or section 78-35a-106(1) (c) would be the same.
4. At oral argument, Murray City Justice Court argued that allowing
defendants who are convicted in justice court to have two separate
avenues of appellate relief is unnecessary and duplicative. This
concern, however, is misplaced. Instead, I think that there is a
certain degree of logic present in allowing a defendant to bypass the
trial de novo stage and instead directly appeal for post-conviction
relief. The financial costs and emotional tolls that are involved in
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having to prepare for and go through a trial de novo can be heavy. In
situations where a defendant has suffered a clear constitutional
wrong at the justice court level, it would seem patently unjust to
require the defendant to pay for and endure a full trial before
allowing the defendant any access to direct appellate review.
Instead, I think that our statutory scheme is wise in allowing
defendants in such situations to immediately petition a court for
redress under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, while at the same
time allowing defendants who are willing to proceed to trial the
opportunity to pursue that course of action instead. Regardless, I
again note that this appears to be the statutorily created system.
Thus, I see no option but to conclude that, as presently constituted,
the Utah Code does allow a defendant to choose between these two
different forms of relief.
5. In its brief and again at oral argument, counsel for Lucero
asserted that, insofar as justice court proceedings are not conducted
on the record, our review of this case should be limited to the
information contained in the justice court docket or filings. The
cases state, however, that an appellate court reviewing a waiver of
that right must be able to look at "' any evidence in the record"' in
order to determine whether the right was properly waived. State v.
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159,122, 27 P.3d 273 (emphasis added) (quoting
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987)); accord State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d
776, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Similarly, I also note my disagreement with Lucerofs assertion
that the trial court in this case should not have received testimony
from witnesses in its efforts to ascertain whether the waiver
proceedings at the justice court were constitutionally valid. In
State v. Gutierrez, the defendant sought to challenge the application
of a repeat offender DUI enhancement statute to his case, therein
arguing that his prior convictions were each invalid. See 2003 UT App
95,112-5, 68 P. 3d 1035. As part of his challenge, the defendant
argued that one of his prior guilty pleas, entered at a justice
court, had been involuntary. See id. at 19. In upholding the use of
the justice court guilty plea by the trial court, we concluded that
Gutierrez had failed to prove involuntariness. See id. at 112.
Addressing Gutierrez's concerns about how he could have established
such proof where the justice court keeps no official record, we noted
that "Gutierrez could have produced testimony from those who were
present regarding the taking of his plea, the court's docket sheet,
or other affirmative evidence." Id. In spite of this clear holding,
Lucero suggests that there is a distinction between the trial court's
use of such testimony for purposes of sentence enhancement and for
use when the trial court reviews a petition for post-conviction
relief. I disagree with that attempted distinction. In both
situations, the trial court is simply exercising its authority to
review the lower proceedings in order to determine whether they were
constitutionally valid. Given the important nature of this solemn

responsibility, I see no reason why the trial court should be limited
in its ability to inquire as to what occurred in the justice court
proceedings. Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial courtTs use
of testimony and extrinsic evidence in this case was proper.
6. Counsel for Murray City Justice Court points us to language in
McDonald, wherein we stated that "a recommendation by the court
against self-representation is not necessary for a defendant to
intelligently waive the right to counsel." 922 P.2d at 785. Murray
City Justice Court argues that this language obviates the duty of
inquiry discussed above. I disagree. A careful reading of the
precedent discussed above indicates that the trial court's specific
duty here is to ensure that the defendant understands the "dangers
and disadvantages" of self-representation. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918
(emphasis added); accord McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779. Though subtle,
there is a clear distinction between a rule requiring the court to
inform a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation and one requiring the court to take the further step
of actually advising the defendant not to represent himself or
herself. The former is simply a fulfillment of the court's duty to
ensure that the defendant has the proper information; the latter
would put the trial court into the role of advisor to the defendant,
a role that would clearly be impermissible. As discussed below, a
subsequent decision by the United States Supreme Court may indicate
that a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation is not required at all stages of litigation. However,
I would stress here that our statement in McDonald regarding the lack
of a "recommendation" requirement does not remove the duty of inquiry
from trial courts before accepting a counsel waiver at the trial
setting.
6. Though Tovar was concededly decided after the events at issue here
took place, it is a "long standing traditional rule . . . that the
law established by a court decision applies both prospectively and
retrospectively, even when the decision overrules prior case law."
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,126, 44 P.3d 626 (quotations and
citations omitted).

